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The development of income inequality in urban China is a hot topic. There is agreement that 
income inequality has tended to increase over the years, but evidence indicates that the 
development has not been smooth. For example, previous studies based on the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP) have found that earnings inequality at the individual level 
as well as income inequality at the household level in urban China increased profoundly from 
1988 to 1995. However, although from 1995 to 2002 earnings inequality continued to 
increase, income inequality at the household level decreased modestly (Gustafsson, Li, and 
Sicular 2008). Rapid growth in incomes caused urban poverty, assessed by a poverty line 
representing constant purchasing power (“absolute poverty”), to diminish rather substantially 
(Appleton, Song, and Xia 2010).  What has happened more recently, during the initial phase 
of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership (2002-7)? In this chapter we aim to shed new light on 
developments during the 2002-7 period using data from the CHIP urban household survey.  
        Our first research question is: How did income, income inequality, and poverty develop? 
To answer this question, we show income growth curves and report estimates of income 
inequality. Furthermore, we show cumulative density functions and report summary measures 
on absolute and relative poverty for 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007. The second research 
question is: What were the forces for change during the period from 2002 to 2007? To 
understand this we decompose the Gini coefficient of disposable household per capita income 
by income components for 2002 and 2007. The third research question is: How have various 
categories of the population fared during the period from 2002 to 2007?  To answer this 





        One major finding is that the period between 2002 and 2007 was characterized by a new 
episode of increased income inequality in urban China.  However, if measured by summary 
indices such as the Gini coefficient, the increase was not as rapid as the increase between 
1988 and 1995. Poverty among urban residents assessed by various poverty lines expressing 
constant purchasing power decreased. It is also true, however, that a slightly larger proportion 
of urban residents were relatively poor, that is, they had per capita incomes falling below a 
relative poverty line defined as a fixed percentage of the median income.   
        We find two sources to be the most important contributors to the increase in inequality 
between 2002 and 2007 -- the rather rapid growth of business income (income from self-
employment and from owning a private business) and the rapid growth of imputed rent from 
owner-occupied housing. These sources originated from policy changes introduced during the 
pre-Hu-Wen leadership period. We find substantial differences in a household’s economic 
situation across cities. China’s urban poverty problem is disproportionally concentrated in 
low-income cities and affluent households are more prevalent in high-income cities. China’s 
children grow up in households with rather different economic situations.  There is also a 
wide variation in economic well-being among the elderly in urban China. 
        There are many aspects of urban inequality in China, and we do not study all of them in 
this chapter. Following many other studies, our analysis concentrates on formal urban 
residents. In other words, we leave aside the important issue of how rural migrants are faring 
and how their increased number has contributed to the development of inequality among all 
persons and households living in urban China. We also note that our focus is on how 
individuals living in households and sharing income with other household members are 
faring, whereas other studies in this volume analyze inequality in workers’ earnings and 
wages (see, for example, Chapter 9 in this volume). Although these two aspects of urban 




this volume which shows that redistribution within Chinese urban households to a large extent 
has counteracted impulses toward increased inequality due to increased unemployment and 
other forms of non-work. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that resources within households 
are equally shared, an assumption that might not be correct in all cases. Yet it is rather 
difficult to replace this with another assumption due to the lack of information on intra-
household allocation in the CHIP survey data. Finally, although our focus is on the 
distribution of income, income obviously is not the only indicator of well-being;  our analysis 
is complementary to parallel studies that focus on other welfare indicators, such as education 
and health (see Chapter 4 on educational inequality).      
        In the next section we provide some background information on how changes in urban 
China during the 2002-7 period are relevant to our research questions. Section III presents the 
data and definitions of some of the key variables. Section IV examines overall development, 
and Section V analyzes the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income components. 
Section VI describes how various categories of persons have fared, and the chapter concludes 
with a summary of our findings.   
 
II. Background 
During the period from 2002 to 2007, the Chinese economy continued to grow at an 
astonishing rate -- GDP rose by 82 percent. Many processes contributed to this development, 
affecting changes in the composition of the affected groups in the population. For example, 
the proportion of young children decreased, whereas the proportion of elderly increased. We 
will discuss those changes considered to have had the most effect on the development of 
income inequality.   
        Change in the types of work-units in which Chinese households earn their incomes has 




state-owned units (including state-owned enterprises [SOEs]) or collective units. During the 
second half of the 1990s, central policies promoted diversified ownership, allowed ineffective 
work-units to go bankrupt, and abolished permanent job tenure. This led to many job losses as 
the aggregate number of those employed in state-owned and collective units declined from 
140 million in 1995 to 80 million in 2002, an enormous loss of 60 million jobs, or 8.6 million 
jobs per year (NBS various years). As a consequence, an employment problem of 
unprecedented magnitude became a strong stimulus for the increased income inequality (see 
also Cai, Chen, and Zhou 2010). Although jobs in state-owned and collective units continued 
to decrease from 2002 to 2007, the reduction slowed to 1.8 million per year; in 2007, 64 
million workers were employed in SOEs and 7 million in collective units.    
        The downsizing and restructuring of the state and collective sector was counteracted by 
the growth of the private sector (see, for example, Chen, Li, and Matlay 2006; Haggard and 
Huang 2008; Dickson 2008; and H. Li et al. 2008). From the second half of the 1950s and 
until 1978, the social and political environment allowed little room for the development of 
either private enterprises or self-employment. Private enterprises were not officially 
recognized until April 1988 when China issued provisional regulations on private enterprises. 
The regulations gave legal status to privately-owned firms that employed eight or more 
workers (called siying qiye). However, adoption of the regulations did not immediately 
change the environment for private business. For example, private entrepreneurs faced, and 
still face, problems of accessing credit via formal channels. Furthermore, complex rules 
govern private enterprise activities and owners must spend considerable time and resources 
interacting with bureaucrats. Most observers agree, however, that opportunities for operating 
private enterprises have improved. An indication of their increased acceptance is that at the 
2002 the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China the constitution was 




        In order to legally run a business as a private owner one must register with the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce at different levels. Official statistics show a 
growing number of registered private enterprises after the 1988 change in legal status. The 
number of private businesses was 139,000 in 1991, over 2 million in 2002, and as many as 5.5 
million in 2007 (Zhongguo siying jingji nianjian 2009). Measured by the scale of their 
operations, private enterprises are rather heterogeneous. There are many small firms (for 
example, in the retail and service sectors) and a few large units in, for example, 
manufacturing and mining. Thus, one would expect the earnings of private owners to be 
rather unequally distributed. Among private firms, in 2002 there were 20 million employees 
and 4.2 million employers; by 2007 the numbers had grown to 46 million employees and 9.8 
million employers  
       Another part of the private sector is made up of the self-employed (see, for example, 
Yueh 2009). During the period of the planned economy, SOEs provided stable employment, 
heavily subsidized housing and health care, as well as old-age security. Self-employment was 
illegal and politically dangerous. However, as the urban reforms proceeded and jobs 
disappeared and the various benefits and subsidies were phased out, the incentives to become 
self-employed increased. Particularly during the early stages of the reform process, switching 
to self-employment was an attractive alternative for low-skilled workers who risked being laid 
off.  More recently, a substantial number of skilled workers and professionals have also 
moved into self-employment. The number of self-employed increased from 23 million in 
2002 to 33 million in 2007 (NBS various years). This means that in 2007 the number of 
persons engaged in the private sector (employees and owners as well as the self-employed) 
reached 79 million, a number higher than the 71 million who were employed in state or 
collective enterprises.  Still, the latter number is larger than the 46 million employed in private 




       The expansion of the private sector means that business income, defined here as income 
from self-employment or from being an owner of a private business, expanded rapidly from 
its low base during the first phase of the Hu-Wen leadership. In Section V we report that 
during these years, business income increased more rapidly than total income. We also report 
that during the period under study property income increased more rapidly than total income. 
However, property income still constitutes a rather small proportion of the total income of 
Chinese households.  
       Although enterprise and property income increased rapidly during the initial years of the 
Hu-Wen leadership, wages from working in an SOE or in a privately owned unit are still the 
primary sources of income. But wage earnings have increased less rapidly than many other 
sources of income.  We report that the share of wage earnings in total income has actually 
fallen. How much a specific household earns in wages depends on various household 
circumstances. These include changes in the household’s labor supply, with a long-run trend 
of fewer adult persons earning income from work, changes in wage rates due to changed 
methods for setting wages, changing demand, and changing supply. Regarding the latter, the 
increased number of rural-to-urban migrants, who most often are low-skilled, presumably 
negatively affected the wages of low-skilled workers. Moreover, the expansion of higher 
education presumably exerted downward pressure on the wages of highly-skilled workers. 
Chapter 9 in this book examines in more detail changes in wage inequality in urban China in 
the 2000s. 
       In pre-reform China an overwhelming majority of households were allocated low-rent 
housing, i.e., received large housing subsidies. Due to the various types of housing reform that 
proceeded at different speeds in different locations, by 2002 most housing in urban China had 
been privatized (see Chapter 3). The privatization followed a pattern by which the tenants 




the market price. The resulting wealth transfers were typically larger for better-off workers 
because these workers generally had been allocated larger apartments in better locations 
(Logan, Fang, and Zhang 2010). For this reason, and due to the transactions on the emerging 
housing market, one can assume that imputed rents from owner-occupied housing are 
positively related to household income. 
       No recent visitor to urban China can fail to note the intense construction activity taking 
place. During the first phase of the Hu-Wen leadership, the housing stock increased rapidly. 
Furthermore, housing demand increased rapidly as well. Many people had accumulated 
savings enabling them to afford housing and, at the same time, access to loans increased. One 
essential part of the picture is that urban residents typically expect future income increases. 
Furthermore, the rapidly increasing housing prices led to expectations of further price 
increases, making urban residents more inclined to invest in the housing market, thus feeding 
price increases even at the risk of creating price bubbles. We observe that housing prices in 
urban China increased rather rapidly during the initial phase of the Hu-Wen leadership (see 
Chapter 3). We report that the rental value of owner-occupied housing, on average, increased 
almost twice as rapidly as total household income.     
       In urban China a very large proportion of women over the age of 55 and men over the age 
of 60 receive pensions as former SOE, government, or collective employees. Few of the 
elderly work for wages; however, many live with their grown and economically active child 
and his or her spouse, and others live alone with their spouse and receive pensions as their 
dominant source of income (for the situation of the elderly during the Mao period see Davis-
Friedmann 1991; and for a analysis of income among the aged using CHIP data from 1988, 
1995, and 2002 see Palmer and Deng 2008). Pension payments are linked to work histories; 
from the perspective of Western observers, income replacement rates are considered to be 




substantial pension incomes. Many retirees with limited means have enjoyed increased real 
income as the minimum enterprise-employee pension increased from 714 yuan per month in 
2005 to 963 yuan per month in 2007 (908 yuan per month in 2005 yuan). With their long 
work careers leading to relatively large apartments, many of the elderly enjoy imputed rents 
from owner-occupied housing. On the whole, China’s older urban population has a living 
standard not significantly different from that enjoyed by the working population.     
       Many of the situations that are described above have increased income inequality at the 
household level. However, most likely other forces are also at work. For example, rapidly 
increased incomes have moved income-earners into higher tax brackets. Although tax 
schedules have been reformed, the progressive tax system presumably counteracted those 
forces leading to higher income inequality. For an analysis of the distributional impact of 
personal income taxes in urban China, see  Chapter 10. 
      
III. Data and Definitions 
For our analysis we use data from the 2002 and 2007 CHIP urban surveys. The 2002 urban 
data cover twelve provinces: Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, 
Guangdong, Chongqing (in 1988 still a part of Sichuan), Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu.  We 
2007 data include these provinces as well as Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Hunan. For 
comparisons with earlier periods, if possible, we use data for the same provinces from the 
1988 and 1995 urban surveys (Sichuan was not surveyed in 1988). The 1988 survey is 
described by Eichen and Zhang (1993), and information on the 1995 and 2002 surveys is 
found in S. Li et al. (2008). Chapter 2 in this volume as well as Appendix II in this volume 
provides details on the 2007 survey.  
       We define household income per capita to include earnings, pensions, business income, 




income includes self-employed income as well as income accruing to private entrepreneurs. 
Our definition of household income also includes imputed rents from owner-occupied 
housing. Following the approach in several other chapters in this volume, we have used the 
market rent approach to estimate the imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing for 
1995, 2002, and 2007 (see Chapter 3).  As this alternative is not available for 1988, for 1988 
we follow the approach of Khan et al. (1993) and define imputed rent of owner-occupied 
housing as 8 percent of the net worth of owner-occupied housing (current replacement value 
minus the outstanding debt). Taxes and fees are treated as negative income. We introduce 
province weights based on the published NBS population data as discussed in Appendix II. 
       The total household income is divided by the number of household members and is then 
ascribed to each household member, making individuals the unit of analysis. Income is 
measured in 2002 constant prices using the NBS urban consumer price index. This study 
differs from Chapter 8 in this volume in that our population includes children and the elderly. 
Following Brandt and Holz (2006), we also take into account spatial price differences.  
 
IV. Overall Development 
Figure 7.1 about here 
In this section we study the overall trends in household income and poverty from 1988 to 
2007. Although developments up to 2002 have been reported in earlier writings, information 
on the 2002-7 period is new. We start by comparing the income growth curves (Ravallion and 
Chen 2003) computed for percentiles, as shown in Figure 7.1 for the three periods 1988-95, 
1995-2002, and 2002-7. Several interesting observations are revealed. Positive growth is 
reported for almost all percentiles and for all three periods. The exception is the lowest nine 
percentiles for the 1988-95 period. Income growth was generally fastest during the 2002-7 




growth of Chinese households accelerated during this first phase of the Hu-Wen leadership. 
For example, income growth at the median was 2.7 percent per annum during the first period, 
4.8 percent during the second period, and an impressive 10.6 percent during the third period. 
        Figure 7.1 also shows that during the most recent period income growth generally was 
fastest at the top of the income distribution and lowest at the bottom; the upward slope means 
that income inequality increased. However, the growth curve for the 2002-7 period is less 
steep than the slope for the 1988-95 period. In contrast, the growth curve for 1995-2002 is 
relatively flat: upward-sloping at the lower percentiles and sloping slightly downward at the 
higher percentiles. From an examination of the slope of the three curves we can conclude that 
income inequality developed differently during the three periods. The period between 1988 
and 1995 was characterized by rapidly increasing income inequality, that between 1995 and 
2002 witnessed few changes, and that between 2002 and 2007 represented a new period of 
increased income inequality.  
       Table 7.1 provides estimates of three often used income inequality indices, computed for 
1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007. The indices reveal the same direction change in inequality as the 
growth curves, although the magnitude differs across the three indices.  A period of rapid 
increases was followed by a small reduction and then by a new episode of increased income 
inequality. According to our estimates, in 2007 the Gini coefficient was 0.323, which by the 
standards of rich countries is not very high, but nor is it extremely low. Looking at the top of 
the distribution, we see that the proportion of individuals having a per capita income of at 
least 200 percent of the contemporary median (i.e., affluent persons) increased rapidly from 4 
percent in 1988 to 9 percent in 1995, fell to 6 percent in 2002, and increased marginally to 7 
percent in 2007.   




       The rather rapid income growth at the lower part of the income distribution between 2002 
and 2007 means that poverty, assessed by an absolute poverty line representing fixed 
purchasing power, decreased rapidly during the period. This is shown in Figure 7.2 where we 
report the Cumulative Density Functions for 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007.  These curves show 
the cumulative proportion of individuals at each level of income. There is one curve for each 
year studied. In the figure we have drawn three alternative poverty lines, all expressed in 
constant purchasing power by using the consumer price index (CPI). Although this approach 
is used in several studies of changes in urban poverty in China (for a survey, see Riskin and 
Gao 2010), some analyses prefer a different approach (see Meng, Gregory, and Wang [2005], 
who re-estimate the cost of a basic needs poverty line for each year during the 1986-2000 
period).  
       There is no official poverty line for urban China, so in our analysis of poverty we use 
poverty lines based on the World Bank’s $1.25 PPP per person per day standard.  The lower 
poverty line in Figure 7.2 corresponds to the US$1.25 PPP per day.  In 2002 prices, this was 
1,761 yuan (Chen and Ravallion 2010).  The second and third poverty lines correspond to two 
and three times this amount, respectively. Within that portion of the graph to the left of the 
poverty lines, the cumulative density function for 2007 is below that of 2002.  Thus, we can 
conclude that poverty as assessed by these poverty lines has continued to decrease. We also 
note that although the decrease at the highest poverty line is substantial, at the lowest poverty 
line the decrease is not easy to detect, because by 2002 a very small proportion of urban 
residents fell below this low poverty line.   
Figure 7.2 about here 
Table 7.2 about here  
       In Table 7.2 we report the numerical values for the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) 




1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007. For each poor unit this family of indices uses its normalized 
poverty gap, which is a number indicating how far below the poverty line the income falls on 
a scale bounded by 0 and (in case of no negative income) 1. Those gaps are raised by a 
positive parameter before the average is taken and then multiplied with the head-count ratio. 
Higher numbers of the parameter give increasing weight to large poverty gaps, and thus 
greater “poverty aversion.” Starting with the lowest line, the US$1.25 world poverty line, we 
see that the proportion of urban residents considered to be poor actually went up from 1 
percent in 1988 to 3 percent in 1995, but thereafter fell to 1 percent in 2002 and was only 0.1 
percent in 2007. However, when doubling the poverty line, not less than one-third of the 
urban residents were considered poor in 1988. The proportion thereafter decreased 
particularly rapidly between 1995 and 2002, reaching only 2 percent in 2007. The other two 
indices tell much the same story about the development of urban poverty. 
       In a rapidly growing economy, does it make sense to assess the extent of poverty solely 
or predominantly against an “absolute” standard? There has been much debate on this issue 
during periods of growth in rich countries. For example, when Eurostat reports how many 
persons and households in the European Union are at risk of becoming poor, the assessment is 
made against a relative poverty line that is defined as a fixed percentage of the median income 
for the country where the person and household resides. For some years, a poverty line set at 
60 percent of the median poverty line was used. A recent study on inequality and poverty in 
thirty rich countries uses the same approach (OECD 2008). In academic work on urban China, 
the approach of setting the poverty line at 50 percent of an urban location has been used. An 
early example is Wong (1995, 1997) where the poverty line is defined as 50 percent of the 
median of the city under investigation (Guangzhou and Shanghai). Another example is Wang 
(2008) who, in a study of the 1986-2000 period, put the poverty line at 50 percent of the 




Guangdong) or, alternatively, at 50 percent of the median in the city where the person resided 
(in one of the three provinces covered in the study). Saunders (2007), in a international 
comparison of poverty among older people in urban China, uses a poverty line set to 50 
percent of the median income for urban China. We follow this approach, putting the poverty 
line at 40, 50, 60, and 70 percent of the contemporary median income in urban China.  The 
results are reported in Table 7.3.       
 
Table 7.3 about here       
       Table 7.3 shows that, for all alternatives applied, relative poverty in urban China has 
increased in all years under study. Whereas 8 percent of urban residents fell under a poverty 
line put at 60 percent of the median income in 1988, the proportion increased to 15 percent in 
1995, to 18 percent in 2002, and to 19 percent in 2007. The latter number is within the range 
or above the average of similarly defined poverty rates for thirty OECD countries in the mid-
2000s (OECD 2008). Note that when we compute the poverty rates, resources received by the 
households within the means-tested minimum living guarantee (dibao) program are 
considered. We can conclude that the expansion of the dibao program for urban residents 
from the mid-1990s and into the new millennium did not fully counteract the underlying 
increase in relative poverty.   
       From the above two exercises conceptualizing and measuring poverty, we can conclude 
that China’s urban poverty record differs dramatically depending on the lens by which it is 
viewed. From a third-world perspective, China is a success story -- in 2007 almost no one fell 
under the US$1.25 poverty line.  However, seen through the lens of rich countries, the 
situation appears to be worrisome. Relative poverty rates in China are not low and urban 
poverty by this measure is not trivial.  A similar conclusion follows from application of the 




and Sato (2004) report poverty rates of 6 to 7 percent for a sample of twelve cities in 1999. 
Another concern is the secular upward trend in relative poverty;  relative poverty rates in 
urban China have been rising steadily for as long as two decades.  
  
V.  How Changed Income Sources Have Affected Income Inequality 
In this section, by decomposing the Gini coefficient for total household income, as defined in 
Section III, we shed light on how income inequality has changed. The Gini coefficient can be 
written as the weighted sum of the concentration coefficients of the various income sources. 






μ      (1) 
 
where kμ  and μ  are the means of income source k  and the total per capita income, 
respectively, and kC  is the concentration coefficient of income source k . The concentration 
coefficient measures the association between income source k  and the total per capita 
income, with values ranging from -1 to +1. If the concentration coefficient is negative, it 
means that low-income earners are receiving larger amounts (in an absolute sense) than high-
income earners. Not only is the sign of the concentration coefficient of interest; its magnitude 
in comparison to the Gini coefficient is an indicator of the distributional profile of the income 
source. If the income source has a concentration coefficient that is equal to the value of the 
Gini coefficient of the total per capita income, the distribution of the income source is as 
equal as total per capita income. However, if the concentration coefficient of an income 
source is greater (or smaller) than the Gini coefficient of total per capita income, this income 




       We define eight components of income and decompose the Gini for 2002 and 2007. 
Table 7.4 lists the components and reports the mean values for the two years under study as 
well as the changes in both absolute and relative terms. The largest component in both years is 
earnings, followed by pensions. Third are imputed rents from owner-occupied housing, a very 
rapidly increasing component. The fourth largest component is business income, which more 
than tripled between 2002 and 2007. Although property income increased rapidly in 2007, it 
is still a minor component of income. Evidence that the planned economy generally had 
disappeared from urban China by 2007 shows up in the rapidly decreasing housing subsidies 
and the small in-kind income. Net transfer income is made up of income taxes and social 
security contributions, income from social relief, fees for participating surveys, private 
transfers, and so forth. The negative signs of income taxes and social security contributions, 
two main components of transfer income in terms of their absolute values, lead to the negative 
signs of net transfer income.      
Table 7.4 about here 
 
       In Table 7.5 let us first inspect the numerical values of the concentration coefficients for 
the income sources with a relative share of larger than 1 percent in 2007. We find that the 
distributional profile of earnings, pensions, and imputed rents from owner-occupied housing 
are all relatively close to the Gini coefficient in both years. In contrast, business income 
moved from being rather equalizing to being marginally dis-equalizing. Property income has 
the highest concentration coefficient of all income sources in 2007, and higher than that in 
2002. The sign of the concentration coefficient for net transfer income changed across the 
years to become proportional to disposable income in 2007.  
       We now use the decomposition to throw light on which channels have led to an increase 




following way: The difference between the two Gini coefficients for the different years can be 
written as:  
∑ −=− )( 001101 kkkk CuCuGG     (2) 
where iku  is the share of income source k  in the total per capita income in year i  (2002 and 
2007), ikC  is the concentration coefficient of the income source k  in year i , and iG  is the 
Gini coefficient of per capita disposable income in year i  (2002 and 2007). The contribution 
to the changed Gini coefficient from each income source, reported in Table 7.6, column 3, in 
turn can be decomposed into changed relative shares (keeping the concentration coefficient 
constant) and changed concentration coefficients (keeping the relative share constant). As the 
latter exercise can be performed using different reference years, we report both alternatives in 
Table 7.6. Thus the numbers in columns 4 and 7 show one alternative decomposition whereas 
the numbers in columns 5 and 6 report the other.  
  
Table 7.6 about here        
       Table 7.6, column 3, shows that the two largest contributors to the increase in the Gini 
coefficient are the two rapidly expanding income sources – business income and imputed 
rents of owner-occupied housing. Business income not only increased its relative share, but 
also became more concentrated among persons in the upper part of the distribution (the 
relative importance of these changes differ in the alternative decompositions). The increased 
contribution from imputed rent of owner-occupied housing is mainly due to its increased 
relative share. Compared to the trend toward increased income inequality from enterprise 
income and imputed rents, the impact of property income was relatively small. Notably, 
changes in earnings as well as in pensions, the two largest income sources, play only a small 




against increased income inequality came mainly from net transfer income (as this component 
has with a negative sign to total income). Other sources of income contributing to reducing 
income inequality include housing subsides and income in-kind. 
 
VI. How Various Groups Have Fared 
How did various groups in urban China fare during the initial phase of the Hu-Wen 
leadership? We will divide the urban population into groups on the basis of three categories:  
ownership sector, age of the individual, and education of the household head.  We will then 
describe changes for each category and estimate multivariate models. For each categorization 
we show growth-curves and report means, measures of income inequality, relative poverty, 
and proportions of affluence.    
       With respect to ownership sector, we find it useful to define three categories: a) persons 
living in a household primarily earning wages from employment in SOEs or government 
institutions (the state sector) b) persons living in households primarily connected to the 
private sector, i.e., workers in privately-owned firms, owners of a private firm, or those 
earning income from self-employment (the private sector), and c) persons living in 
households with no working adult, i.e., mainly elderly persons living on pensions (non-
workers). Our divisions are based on the presumption that the trend toward higher income in 
the 2002-7 period is strongest at the top of the income distribution within the dynamic and 
rapidly expanding private sector, and that this income growth came not only from higher 
wages among skilled workers in private firms, but also from higher incomes earned by private 
owners as well as from rapidly increasing imputed rents from owner-occupied housing. We 
also hypothesize that incomes at the top of the income distribution in the slowly shrinking 
state sector have increased, but not as rapidly as those in the private sector. In contrast, 




to decreased labor supply and comparatively slow earnings development, for example among 
less-skilled workers. Furthermore, we are interested in how spatial characteristics measured 
by the mean income in the city where the household resides affect the income level. In our 
reading of the literature, the differences in distribution of income in urban China across cities 
have not attracted much research interest. One exception is Wang (2008) who studied urban 
income inequality among employed individuals in the three provinces of Liaoning, Sichuan, 
and Guangdong from 1986 to 2000. Based on his results, during the period under study, city 
differences played a large and increasing role in urban income inequality.        
       Applying our categories, we find that the proportion of people primarily connected to the 
private sector increased from 25 percent in 2002 to 35 percent in 2007; mirroring this, during 
the same period the proportion primarily connected to the state sector decreased from 64 
percent to 54 percent. In both years, 11 percent of people in urban China lived in households 
with no adult worker (see Table 7.7). Figure 7.3 shows that, as expected, income growth was 
fastest at the top of the private sector, but also among non-workers in the lower part of the 
distribution. There is a pattern of people in the state sector experiencing slower income 
growth than people in the private sector. At the median, income growth was fastest in the 
private sector, followed by non-workers, and finally in the state sector. The upward sloping 
growth curves for the private and public sectors indicate that income inequality within those 
sectors increased, as also shown by the Gini coefficients reported in Table 7.7. In contrast, the 
growth curve for non-workers is sloping downward rather than upward for most of the 
distribution, and the Gini for this category did not change between the two years. Similarly, 
although the relative poverty rates for people in the private and state sectors increased from 
2002 to 2007, among non-worker households the development was the opposite.      
Figure 7.3 about here 





       Developments in the three sectors to a certain extent mirror those in two other alternative 
disaggregations of the population. In Figure 7.4 and Table 7.8 we divide the population into 
children (a category with a decreasing share of the population), and adults and elderly (a 
category with an increasing share of the population). In contrast to the case in many rich 
countries, the mean income of the elderly is higher than that of adults. Although the overall 
impression from Figure 7.4 is that income growth has not been different for the three age 
groups, there are certain noteworthy differences. The elderly stand out in terms of a rapid 
increase at both tails of the distribution, but not in the middle. Income inequality measured by 
the Gini coefficient within this category increased whereas relative poverty decreased slightly. 
Income inequality also increased among children and adults. Relative poverty rates increased 
somewhat for both children and adults. It should be noted that the highest growth rates are 
observed at the top of the distributions for children and the elderly, but not for the adults.  
Figure 7.4 about here 
Table 7.8 about here 
Figure 7.5 about here 
Table 7.9 about here 
 
       As opposed to rural China, few persons in urban China live in households headed by a 
person with only a primary education. In Figure 7.5, showing growth curves for persons living 
in households with the head having different levels of education, we find a difference between 
the less-educated, many of whom are elderly, and all others. Incomes grew fastest among the 
less-educated at the lowest part of the distribution. For those with education at the high school 
level and higher, the growth curve indicates increased income inequality and increased rather 




       The overall impression from the bivariate analysis is that at the middle of the income 
distribution, the changes were similar for the various subgroups. This is confirmed when we 
run regression models for 2002 and 2007 and compare the coefficients across years. The 
explanatory variables measure the schooling of the household head, the age of the household 
head, and the age of household head squared. Continuous variables measure the number of 
children in the household, the number of adults working in the state sector, the number of 
adults working in the private sector, the number of non-working adults, the number of elderly 
with pensions, and the number of elderly without pensions. A dummy for Han ethnicity as a 
control variable is included in the specification, as is the log of city per capita income and 
dummies for the province. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in 
the Appendix to this chapter.  
Table 7.10 about here 
       The regression estimates are reported in Table 7.10. They show that household per capita 
income is closely and positively linked to the mean income of the city where the household 
resides. The estimates for the coefficients for the years of schooling are 0.047 in 2002 and 
0.050 in 2007, that is, they are quite similar. Household per capita income decreases with the 
number of adult household members, and most rapidly if the household member is not 
employed. Although the number of elderly with pensions positively affects per capita income, 
the opposite is the case for elderly without pensions. Among the coefficients for the province 
dummies, the positive coefficient for Guangdong stands out as having a high t-value in both 
years.      
       In a second step, we focus on individuals at the two tails of the income distribution. We 
specify one probit model where the dependent variable is relative poverty, defined as 
household per capita income below 70 percent of the median per capita income. In another 




per capita income of at least 200 percent of the median per capita income. The explanatory 
variables are the same for both models and for the linear regression model. The estimates are 
documented in the Appendix to this chapter.  In Table 7.11 we present the main results as 
predicted probabilities for some typical individuals.  
Table 7.11 about here 
       The overall impression from Table 7.11 is that differences in the mean city income can 
make a rather large difference in terms of the probability of being relatively poor or being 
well-to-do. Consider the typical individual A who lives in a household consisting of two 
employed adults and a child, and where the household head has nine years of education. The 
probability of being poor in 2002 ranges from less than 1 percent if the household resides in a 
high-income city and up to 5 percent if the household resides in a low-income city. In 2007 
the corresponding variation increases from 7 percent to as much as 55 percent. This example 
illustrates that although the relative poverty rate in the 2007 sample is only slightly higher 
than the relative poverty rate in the 2002 sample, there may be hidden substantial increased 
poverty risks for households with certain characteristics.  
       The predictions in Table 7.11 also show that children and the elderly fare rather 
differently depending on their household. Among the elderly, there is substantial variation 
based on city income, the type of household, and whether or not the elderly receives a pension.  
It is striking that an elderly person without a pension living in a multi-generational household 
(individual B) in a low-income city in 2007 is predicted to have a 67 percent probability of 
being poor and a less than 1 percent probability of being rich. In contrast, a person living with 
one’s spouse (individual G) in a high-income city has less than a 1 percent probability of 
being poor and a 93 percent probability of being affluent. The simulations also illustrate how 
the probabilities are affected if one adult loses his or her job (compare individual A and 




individual C and individual D), whether or not there is a child (compare individual D and 
individual E), and whether or not there is an elderly person receiving a pension (compare 
individual F and individual E).  
       The findings in this section reveal differences in how various categories of Chinese 
urbanites fared between 2002 and 2007. For example, households closely connected to the 
expanding private sector and at the top of the income distribution experienced more rapid 
income increases than most other households. Furthermore, although relative poverty 
increased from 2002 to 2007 for children as well as for adults, this was not the case for the 
elderly. Overall, however, the data do not indicate any dramatic change in income 
determination from 2002 to 2007.  
       In contrast, we find substantial differences in the economic situation of households across 
cities. China’s urban poverty problem is disproportionally concentrated in low-income cities 
and affluent households are disproportionately concentrated in high-income cities. We have 
reported a wide variation in household income among urban households with children or with 
elderly. Elderly couples living alone, particularly if they live in high-income cities, fare much 
better than elderly living in multi-generational households, particularly in households in low-
income cities.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
In this chapter we study income changes among Chinese formal urban residents between 2002 
and 2007, with comparisons to earlier periods. Using the CHIP urban household survey data, 
we investigate trends in real income, income inequality, and poverty. The reasons for the 
changes in income inequality are investigated by decomposing the Gini coefficient for per 
capita household income by income components. Furthermore, we describe how various 




ownership of the workplace (or, alternatively, not working); age of the individual; and 
education of the household head. We show the bivariate analyses and estimate income 
functions for these different population groups.   
       We report that overall income increased more rapidly in urban China between 2002 and 
2007 than it did during the two preceding periods of 1988-95 and 1995-2002. For example, 
although median per capita income grew by 2.7 percent per annum from 1988 to 1995, it grew 
by 4.8 percent from 1995 to 2002 and it grew by as much as 10.6 percent from 2002 to 2007. 
In contrast to the 1995-2002 period, income inequality increased between 2002 and 2007, 
although the increase was not as rapid as that between 1988 and 1995.  
       The increases in real income at the bottom of the income distribution from 2002 to 2007 
mean that, assessed against absolute poverty lines representing constant purchasing power, the 
proportion of people considered to be poor decreased. However, as such income gains were 
slower than those at the median, the trend of increased relative poverty in urban China 
continued. Therefore, views about China’s poverty problem very much depend on the 
perspective by which it is viewed. If households are observed through a lens that is used to 
view low-income countries, poverty is not a problem in urban China today. However, if 
viewed through a lens used to view high-income countries, the poverty problem among 
Chinese urban residents is similar to that in many rich countries.  
       Income inequality among urban residents increased through two major channels. The 
most important channel was the rapid increase in income from private businesses and self-
employment at the top of the income distribution. In 2007 China had more private 
entrepreneurs and persons who were self-employed than it had in 2002, and their incomes 
were increasingly concentrated in the higher segments of the income distribution. The second 
most important factor contributing to increased urban income inequality was the rather rapid 




stock of owner-occupied housing as well as to the rapid increases in housing prices.  
Interestingly, neither wage earnings outside of the private sector nor pensions were a major 
factor contributing to the increase in inequality.   
     Between 2002 and 2007 Chinese urbanites did not enjoy a uniform rate of income growth. 
For example, households closely connected to the expanding private sector and at the higher 
end of their income distribution experienced more rapid income increases than most other 
households. However, the overall impression has been that no dramatic changes in income 
determination occurred between 2002 and 2007. In contrast, we have reported substantial 
differences in the economic situation of households across cities. China’s urban poverty 
problem is disproportionally concentrated in low-income cities and affluent households are 
most prevalent in high-income cities. We have also illustrated that urban children and urban 
elderly reside in households with rather diverse economic circumstances. Elderly couples 
living alone, particularly if they live in high-income cities, fare much better than those living 
in multi-generational households, particularly if they are living in low-income cities.  
       Thus, in this chapter we show that China’s road toward increased income inequality did 
not come to a halt during the first phase of the Hu-Wen leadership. On the contrary, both 
income inequality and relative poverty increased. It should be stressed, however, that our 
analysis indicates that the major factors driving increased income inequality were the rapid 
increases in income from the private sector, particularly at the top of the distribution, as well 
as increased imputed rents from owner-occupied housing. Both these factors can be attributed 
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Table 7A.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
 2002 2007 
Schooling of the household head  10.67 11.99 
Age of the household head 47.67 48.99 
Age of the household head squared 2394.96 2535.29 
No. of children in the household 0.49 0.44 
No. of adults working in the state sector 2.10 1.78 
No. of adults working in the non-state sector 0.83 1.15 
No. of non-working adults 0.30 0.27 
No. of elderly with a pension 0.27 0.32 
No. of elderly without a pension 0.07 0.06 
Han ethnicity 0.96 0.97 
Log of city per capita income 8.94 9.46 
Beijing 0.07 0.11 
Shanxi 0.09 0.08 
Liaoning 0.10 0.10 
Jiangsu 0.10 0.08 
Anhui 0.07 0.07 
Henan 0.10 0.09 
Hubei 0.10 0.05 
Guangdong 0.09 0.11 




Sichuan 0.08 0.08 
Yunnan 0.09 0.08 
Gansu 0.06 0.08 

























Table 7A.2. Poverty function (poverty line set at 70 percent of the median income) 
 
                   2002                  2007 
Schooling of the household 
head  -0.189*** -0.201*** 
 [0.006] [0.007] 
Age of the household head 0.047*** -0.005 
 [0.015] [0.014] 
Age of the household head 
squared -0.001*** -0.0002* 
 [0.0002] [0.0001] 
No. of children in the household 0.323*** 0.178*** 
 [0.043] [0.041] 
No. of adults working in the 
state sector 0.480*** 0.683*** 
 [0.028] [0.026] 
No. of adults working in the 
non-state sector 0.729*** 0.837*** 
 [0.029] [0.026] 
No. of non-working adults 0.884*** 1.135*** 
 [0.039] [0.043] 
No. of elderly with a pension -0.553*** -0.514*** 
 [0.052] [0.047] 
No. of elderly without a pension 0.709*** 0.484*** 




Han ethnicity 0.238** 0.013 
 [0.103] [0.105] 
Log of city per capita income -3.334*** -3.403*** 
 [0.105] [0.097] 
Beijing   
   
Shanxi 3.018*** -0.092 
 [0.515] [0.122] 
Liaoning 2.762*** 0.185 
 [0.512] [0.115] 
Jiangsu 3.001*** 0.285** 
 [0.511] [0.122] 
Anhui 3.117*** -0.107 
 [0.513] [0.120] 
Henan 3.025*** -0.089 
 [0.512] [0.117] 
Hubei 2.753*** 0.153 
 [0.512] [0.123] 
Guangdong 2.414*** -0.409*** 
 [0.514] [0.122] 
Chongqing 3.089*** -0.299** 
 [0.516] [0.126] 
Sichuan 3.028*** 0.416*** 
 [0.513] [0.117] 




 [0.512] [0.120] 
Gansu 2.930*** 0.236* 
 [0.514] [0.121] 
Constant 24.832*** 31.496*** 
 [1.155] [1.023] 
   
Pseudo R2 0.25722499 0.27872734 
No. of observations 20626 21545 
 
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, *** indicates statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
We set the poverty line at 70 percent of the median income because at a poverty line of 60 
percent of the median income, no one in Beijing is poor, which makes it impossible to 
estimate the poverty function. 





Table 7A.3. Affluence function, with 200% of the median income as the threshold 
 
                   2002                 2007 
Schooling of the household 
head  0.217*** 0.277*** 
 [0.010] [0.011] 
Age of the household head 0.019 0.012 
 [0.022] [0.017] 
Age of the household head 
squared 
0.00004 0.00001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
No. of children in the 
household -0.466*** -0.364*** 
 [0.076] [0.069] 
No. of adults working in the 
state sector -1.250*** -0.915*** 
 [0.053] [0.045] 
No. of adults working in the 
non-state sector -1.460*** -0.963*** 
 [0.058] [0.046] 
No. of non-working adults -1.526*** -1.297*** 
 [0.081] [0.082] 
No. of elderly with a pension 0.233*** 0.432*** 




No. of elderly without a 
pension -0.591*** 0.112 
 [0.176] [0.147] 
Han ethnicity -0.344** 0.223 
 [0.143] [0.161] 
Log of city per capita income 4.369*** 3.890*** 
 [0.209] [0.143] 
Beijing   
   
Shanxi 0.555*** 0.237 
 [0.188] [0.176] 
Liaoning 0.134 -0.049 
 [0.144] [0.119] 
Jiangsu 0.316** 0.116 
 [0.126] [0.088] 
Anhui 0.065 -0.066 
 [0.195] [0.146] 
Henan 0.354** -0.161 
 [0.154] [0.121] 
Hubei -0.207 0.032 
 [0.205] [0.155] 
Guangdong 0.683*** 0.636*** 
 [0.103] [0.083] 
Chongqing 0.592*** 0.275* 




Sichuan 0.467*** 0.541*** 
 [0.172] [0.128] 
Yunnan 0.044 0.738*** 
 [0.167] [0.161] 
Gansu 0.032 -0.336 
 [0.210] [0.214] 
Constant -41.185*** -41.205*** 
 [2.062] [1.501] 
   
Pseudo R2 0.2984 0.3025 
No. of observations 20626 21545 
Note: A person living in a household with a disposable per capita income of at least 200 
percent of the median income as observed during the year under study is classified as affluent.  
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, *** indicates statistical significance at the 
1% level. 






Figure 7.1 Income Growth Curves for the 1988-95, 1995-2002, and 2002-7 periods (annual 
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Source:  Authors’ computations from the CHIP. 
Note: Income is expressed in 2000 prices using the spatial price index of Brandt and Holz 




Figure 7.3 Growth Curves for Individuals Living in Households Primarily Connected to the 
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Figure 7.5 Growth Curves for Individuals Where the Heads of the Household Have Various 
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income Gini MLD 
Theil 
index 
Proportion having income above 
200 percent of median income 
Percent 
1988 4520 4173 0.2104 0.0726 0.0768 3.60 
1995 6037 5034 0.3340 0.1931 0.2422 8.80 
2002 8078 6993 0.3039 0.1554 0.1551 6.08 
2007 13796 11593 0.3229 0.1790 0.1753 6.82 
Source: Authors’ computations using the CHIP data, in 2002 prices with adjustments for 




Table 7.2. Absolute poverty in urban China, 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007  
 
FGT indices: 1761 as the poverty line 
 FGT(0), Poverty rate FGT(1) FGT(2) 
1988 0.0135 0.0031 0.0089 
1995 0.0269 0.0062 0.0027 
2002 0.0106 0.0022 0.0008 
2007 0.0014 0.0004 0.0002 
 
FGT indices: 3522 as the poverty line 
 FGT(0), Poverty rate FGT(1) FGT(2) 
1988 0.3287 0.0648 0.0223 
1995 0.2439 0.0591 0.0228 
2002 0.1114 0.0261 0.0096 
2007 0.0241 0.0049 0.0016 




Table 7.3. Relative poverty in urban China, computed using various relative poverty lines, 














40% 0.98 4.13 5.15 5.92 
50% 3.23 8.49 10.90 11.81 
60% 8.00 15.21 18.06 18.87 
70% 15.67 24.45 25.67 26.40 





Table 7.4. Components and growth of household income per capita, 2002 and 2007  
 Household income per 
capita 
Growth 
 2002 2007 Amount Annualized 
growth rate 
(%) 
Earnings 5573.92 9071.66 3497.74 10.23  
Pensions  1399.50 2642.54 1243.04 13.56  
Imputed rents of owner-
occupied housing  483.55 1458.79 975.24 24.71  
Business income 266.37 985.65 719.28 29.91  
Property income 91.63 209.81 118.18 18.02  
Income in-kind  81.87 88.40 6.53 1.55  
Housing subsidies 231.22 86.74 -144.48 -17.81  
Net transfer income -49.70 -747.44 -697.74 71.97  
     
Total per capita income  8078.37 13796.14 5717.77 11.30  










Table 7.5. Household income per capita and its decomposition, 2002 and 2007 
 







69.00 0.2930 66.52 65.76 0.3101 63.15 
Pensions 
17.32 0.3341 19.04 19.15 0.3116 18.48 
Imputed rents of 
owner-occupied 
housing 
5.99 0.3353 6.60 10.57 0.3421 11.20 
Business income 
3.30 0.0580 0.63 7.14 0.3650 8.08 
Property income 





1.01 0.4836 1.61 0.64 0.4840 0.96 
Housing subsidies 
2.86 0.3485 3.28 0.63 0.2255 0.44 
Net transfer 
income 
-0.62 -0.2612 0.53 -5.42 0.3439 -5.77 
       
Total per capita 
income 100 0.3039 100 100 0.3229 100 




Table 7.6.  Decomposing differences in the Gini coefficient for 2002 and 2007 by income 
sources 






(Column 2 - column 
1)   
C02 (u07 
– u02 ) 
u02 (C07 
– C02 ) 
C07 (u07 
– u02 ) 
u07(C07- 
C02) 
Column number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Earnings 
0.2022  0.2039  0.0018 -0.0095 0.0118  -0.0100  0.0112 
Pensions  
0.0579  0.0597  0.0018 0.0061 -0.0039  0.0057  -0.0043 




0.0201  0.0362  0.0161 0.0154 0.0004  0.0157  0.0007 
Business 
income  
0.0019  0.0261  0.0241 0.0022 0.0101  0.0140  0.0219 
Property 
income 
0.0054  0.0111  0.0058 0.0019 0.0029  0.0029  0.0039 
Income in- kind 
0.0049  0.0031  -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0000  -0.0018  0.0000 
Housing 
subsidies 





0.0186  -0.0203 0.0125 -0.0038  -0.0165  -0.0328 
 
       
Total per capita 
income  
0.3039  0.3229  0.0190 0.0190 0.0141  0.0049  -0.0001 
Source: See Table 7.5. Values in column 3 are equal to the sum of the values in columns 5 




Table 7.7. Population shares, mean income, income inequality, and relative poverty among 
individuals living in households primarily connected to the state sector, the private sector, 
and those with no workers, 2002 and 2007 






















Proportion of all 
individuals (%) 
63.99 25.13 10.89 
53.99 34.78 11.23 
Average income 
8537 6718 8519 14646 12112 14924 
Gini 
0.2868 0.3165 0.3296 0.3063 0.337 0.3292 
Percentage of persons 
under 40% of the 
median income 
4.02 5.18 8.68 4.51 5.95 6.73 
Percentage of persons 
under 50% of the 
median income 
8.94 9.42 15.51 10.38 12.79 12.95 
Percentage of persons 
under 60% of the 
median income 
15.05 16.92 22.78 17.65 19.91 19.41 
Percentage of persons 
under 70% of the 
median income 
23.12 26.25 29.82 25.44 27.47 25.70 
Percentage of persons 
above 200% of the 





Note: A household is classified as primarily linked to the state sector (private sector) if most 
workers are employed in the state sector (private sector). If the number of workers in the state 
sector is equal to the number of workers in the private sector, the household is classified as 
primarily linked to the state sector. As a consequence, we report a larger proportion of 
households primarily linked to the state sector than the proportion of state-employed 
individuals, as according to the Statistical Yearbook of China.  





Table 7.8. Population shares, mean income, income inequality, and relative poverty among 
children, adults, and the elderly, 2002 and 2007 
 
 
  2002   2007  
 Children Adults Elderly Children Adults Elderly 
Population shares  14.31 74.95 10.74 12.64 74.74 12.62 
Average income 7084 8155 8899 12498 13751 15365 
Gini 0.2914 0.3043 0.3008 0.3296 0.3194 0.3275 
Percentage of persons under 
40% of the median income 4.97 5.02 6.94 6.17  6.00  5.18 
Percentage of persons under 
50% of the median income 10.26 10.67 12.36 12.32  12.00  10.15 
Percentage of persons under 
60% of the median income 17.02 17.69 19.56 18.92  18.82  17.74 
Percentage of persons under 
70% of the median income 24.60 25.48 26.77 26.38  26.52  24.37 
Percentage of persons above 
200% of the median income 8.59 9.99 9.95 11.60  10.80  12.42 
Note:   A person is regarded as a child if she is under the age of 16 and as elderly if she is age 
61 or older.  











Table 7.9. Population shares, mean income, income inequality, and relative poverty among 
individuals living in households with the heads of households having different levels of 
education, 2002 and 2007 
 
 



















Population shares 7.45 29.51 36.98 26.07 5.75 25.58 35.27 33.39 
Average income 5949 6815 7988 10243 10121 11063 13041 17319 
Gini 0.2957 0.297 0.2844 0.287 0.2876 0.3025 0.3082 0.3107 
Percentage of 
persons under 40% 
of the median 
income 
4.65  5.05  4.75 3.36 4.08 6.05  6.45 3.95 
Percentage of 
persons under 50% 
of the median 
income 
10.47  9.29  9.77 8.22 8.07 10.59  11.67 9.23 
Percentage of 
persons under 60% 
of the median 
income 
17.96  16.89  16.60 16.11 14.51 19.45  19.08 16.22 
Percentage of 








200% of the median 
income 
7.60  9.43  8.82 9.52 9.31 9.36  9.17 11.16 




Table 7.10. Income function: Dependent variable, log of household per capita income 
 
 2002 2007 
Schooling of household head  0.047*** 0.050*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
Age of household head -0.006** -0.003* 
 [0.002] [0.002] 
Age of household head 
squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] 
No. of children in the 
household -0.066*** -0.065*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] 
No. of adults working in the 
state sector -0.147*** -0.152*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
No. of adults working in the 
non-state sector -0.196*** -0.185*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
No. of non-working adults -0.232*** -0.247*** 
 [0.006] [0.007] 
No. of elderly with pensions 0.101*** 0.087*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] 
No. of elderly without 




 [0.011] [0.012] 
Han ethnicity -0.068*** 0.016 
 [0.016] [0.017] 
Log of city per capita income 0.861*** 0.843*** 
 [0.016] [0.012] 
Beijing   
   
Shanxi -0.070*** 0.010 
 [0.020] [0.017] 
Liaoning -0.019 -0.003 
 [0.016] [0.015] 
Jiangsu -0.032** -0.014 
 [0.015] [0.014] 
Anhui -0.049** -0.007 
 [0.019] [0.017] 
Henan -0.027 -0.012 
 [0.017] [0.016] 
Hubei -0.029 -0.017 
 [0.018] [0.018] 
Guangdong 0.047*** 0.130*** 
 [0.015] [0.014] 
Chongqing -0.056*** 0.050*** 
 [0.020] [0.019] 
Sichuan -0.049*** -0.031* 




Yunnan -0.025 0.043** 
 [0.018] [0.018] 
Gansu -0.054*** -0.035* 
 [0.020] [0.018] 
Constant 1.264*** 1.238*** 
 [0.158] [0.136] 
   
Adj. R2 0.4466 0.4785 
No. of observations 20624 21545 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at 
the 1% level.   





















Household head aged 47.9 years, 9 years 
of education, 2 adults employed in the 
state sector, 1 non-working adult, 1 
child, Han 
4.67 
15.5  55.36  1.09  0.35  
2.13   
6.0  25.60  3.11  1.55  
0.31  




The same as A, but the household 
increases by one elderly person without 
a pension  
9.06 
26.2  66.81  0.65  0.35  
4.24 
11.0  35.83  1.86  1.55  
0.62  




The same as A, but one worker becomes 
a non-worker 
6.84  
21.1  66.09  0.85  0.24  
3.16   
8.5  35.10  2.44  1.09  
0.46   
2.4  9.94  25.01  6.62  
D Low The same as C, but the household head 
has 16 years of education  
1.91   






0.86   
2.3  11.70  9.99  7.23  
0.12   




The same as D, but there is no child in 
the household  
1.39   
5.1  28.57  5.84  2.52  
0.62   
1.8  9.99  15.32  10.42 
0.09   




The same as E, but the household 
increases by one elderly person with a 
pension 
0.81  
3.2  19.31  7.41  3.83  
0.36  
1.1  6.23  18.91  15.17 
0.05  




An elderly couple living alone. The 
household head is 65 years  old, has nine 
years of education, there is no child in 
the household, and one elderly person 
has a pension  
0.24  
0.9  3.54  51.98  31.67 
0.11  
0.3  1.01  75.93  67.58 
0.02   
0.1  0.21  97.68  93.07 
Note: Low/median/high city income is defined as the mean for the first decile / the median / 
the tenth decile for the year under study. 
Poverty is defined as living in a household with average disposable income that is less than 70 
percent of the median income in urban China during the same year.  
Source:  Estimates presented in the Appendix to this chapter. 
 
